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Abstract: According to Paul Boghossian (2006, 73) a core tenet of epistemic relativism is what
he calls epistemic pluralism, according to which (i) ‘there are many fundamentally different, gen-
uinely alternative epistemic systems’, but (ii) ‘no facts by virtue of which one of these systems is
more correct than any of the others’. Embracing the former claim is more or less uncontroversial–
viz., a descriptive fact about epistemic diversity. The latter claim by contrast is very controversial.
Interestingly, the Wittgenstenian ‘hinge’ epistemologist, in virtue of maintaining that rational
evaluation is essentially local, will (arguably, at least) be committed to the more controversial leg
of the epistemic pluralist thesis, simply in virtue of countenancing the descriptive leg. This paper
does three central things. First, it is shown that this ‘relativistic’ reading of Wittgenstein’s epis-
temology is plausible only if the locality of rational evaluation (in conjunction with a reasonable
appreciation of epistemic diversity) commits the Wittgenstenian to a further epistemic incom-
mensurability thesis. Next, Duncan Pritchard’s (e.g., 2009; 2015) novel attempt to save the hinge
epistemologist from a commitment to epistemic incommensurability is canvassed and critiqued.
Finally, it is suggested how, regardless of whether Pritchard’s strategy is successful, there might
be another very different way—drawing from recent work by John MacFarlane (2014)—for the
hinge epistemologist to embrace epistemic pluralism while steering clear of epistemic relativism,
understood in a very specific way.
introduction
According to Paul Boghossian (2006, 73), a core tenet of epistemic relativism is what
he calls epistemic pluralism, the thesis that (i) ‘there are many fundamentally differ-
ent, genuinely alternative epistemic systems’, but (ii) ‘no facts by virtue of which one
of these systems is more correct than any of the others.’1 Metaepistemological abso-




controversial (ii), and with this assumption in hand, insist that (ii) is false even if the
descriptive claim captured by (i) is true2.
Interestingly, though, this stock absolutist response to the pluralist component
of epistemic relativism is plausibly not available to the Wittgenstenian ‘hinge’ episte-
mologist3, for whom the more controversial element of epistemic pluralism, (ii), is
(arguably) inevitable once it is affirmed that there are many, or indeed any, funda-
mentally different, genuinely alternative epistemic systems. This raises an important
dilemma for the would-be Wittgenstenian epistemologist: either grant that a hinge
epistemology is essentially a relativistic epistemology (one which embraces both legs
of the epistemic pluralism thesis), or alternatively deny at least some version of the
widely accepted descriptive claim that there are many fundamentally different, gen-
uinely alternative epistemic systems. In the face of this dilemma, Duncan Pritchard
(2009; 2010; 2015) has recently defended a non-relativistic reading of Wittgenstein’s
epistemology, and accordingly, has sought to reject, with some qualifications, the de-
scriptive component of the epistemic pluralist thesis.
Here is the plan. §1 distinguishes between different versions of descriptive epis-
temic pluralism, clarifying which version (paired with a Wittgenstenian epistemol-
ogy) arguably commits one to the stronger ‘equal standing’ leg of epistemic pluralism.
§§2–3 outline and critique Pritchard’s anti-relativistic response to relativist interpre-
tations of Wittgenstein’s epistemology, with a focus on Pritchard’s Davidsonian and
‘über hinge’ strategies—viz., strategies that can be used to resist with some qualifica-
tions the version of descriptive leg of the epistemic pluralist thesis that would seem to
commit the hinge epistemologist to epistemic incommensurability. §4 suggests how,
regardless of whether Pritchard’s strategy succeeds, the Wittgenstenian hinge epis-
temologist might nonetheless have available a metaepistemological rationale for ac-
cepting (within aWittgenstenian framework) the very version of descriptive pluralism
whichPritchard’s brand of hinge epistemology rejects, whilst nonetheless avoiding any
further commitment to epistemic relativism, understood along certain specific lines.
2For a notable expression of themore idea that descriptive forms of relativismdonot entail relativism
in a philosophically interesting sense, see Rachels (2003, e.g, 16-23); see also Boghossian (2006, Ch. 5–6).
Cf., Baghramian and Carter (2015, §2.1) for an overview of various discussions of descriptive relativism
in epistemology.
3I will be using ‘hinge epistemology’ to refer to the epistemological theses clustered around the
notion of a ‘hinge proposition’ as advanced in Wittgenstein’s posthumous On Certainty (1969). See also
Coliva (2010b) and Pritchard (2015) for some notable contemporary expositions of this approach.
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1. descriptive epistemic pluralism, epistemic incommensura-
bility and relativism
Everyone ought to be an epistemic pluralist in a very minimal (and uninteresting)
sense: we should all agree that not all epistemic systems are identical. Define an ‘epis-
temic system’ as a set of epistemic principles. Epistemic principles are, to follow here
Paul Boghossian (e.g., 2001; 2006) general normative propositions that specify the
conditions underwhich certain beliefs have positive or negative epistemicmerit4. Call
the thesis that not all epistemic systems are identical weak descriptive epistemic plural-
ism.
We also needn’t stray from what’s entirely obvious to embrace a slightly stronger
version of descriptive epistemic relativism according towhich some epistemic systems
are significantly different from other epistemic systems, where ‘significantly’ means
more than simply ‘non-identical’. Call this moderate descriptive epistemic pluralism.
Consider briefly a sample of some ‘wayward5’ features of certain contemporary epis-
temic systems:
Zetetic Astronomy: Maintains that the earth is a ‘flat disk centered at the
North Pole’ and that the ‘sun,moon, planets, and stars only a few hundred
miles above the surface of the earth’6.
Amondawa tribe: Lacks linguistic structures that relate time and space,
and furthermore, lacks any abstract concept of ‘time’7.
Yaohnanen: This tribe is convinced that Prince Phillip, the current Duke
of Edinburgh, is the embodiment of a spirit that was born on a volcano
on their island, the ‘pale-skinned son of the mountain spirit8.’
The Zetetic Astronomers, the Amondawa and the Yaohnanen part ways with us
not just peripherally, but fundamentally, when it comes to the nature of the planet
we occupy, the relatedness of time and space, and Prince Philip’s divine attributes,
4At least providedwe are cognitivists, epistemic principles can be true or false. By contrast, epistemic
rules are prescriptive; for example, In conditions C, belief in way W. Epistemic principles, if true, imply
epistemic rules or norms which, qua prescriptive, are not truth-apt. For example, if the principle Beliefs
formed on the basis of wishful thinking are unjustified is true, then its truth gives rise to a non-truth-apt
prescriptive epistemic rule to the effect that: If your basis for B is wishful thinking, don’t believe B.
5I borrow this expression from Quassim Cassam (2016).
6https://www.theflatearthsociety.org/home/index.php/about-the-society.
7See for example Sinha et al. (2011). For some examples of similar cases of epistemic diversity that




respectively. We should all bemoderate descriptive epistemic pluralists because there’s
plenty of evidence for the existence of these kinds of belief systems.
This said, let’s revisit more carefully the component of epistemic relativism that
Paul Boghossian calls epistemic pluralism, a doctrine that is comprised of two theses:
Epistemic pluralism: (i) ‘there are many fundamentally different, gen-
uinely alternative epistemic systems’, but (ii) ‘no facts by virtue of which
one of these systems is more correct than any of the others’9.
The first leg is effectively the thesis we are calling moderate descriptive epistemic
pluralism (hereafter, MDEP), a thesis we should all accept. The second thesis is, how-
ever, deeply controversial. Whereas absolutists and relativists alike should accept
MDEP, absolutists deny (ii) while relativists accept it. From the absolutists’s perspec-
tive, there needn’t be anything philosophically significant about diversity of opinion,
even when it is radical. The absolutist’s stock diagnosis of radically divergent epis-
temic systems (and ensuing disagreements owing to such divergent systems) will be
that at least one such system is riddled with error. The relativist is inclined to a differ-
ent diagnosis. For ease of exposition, let’s call the second leg of the epistemic pluralist’s
thesis equal standing, to capture the claim that there are no facts by virtue of which
any epistemic system is more correct than any other.
One reasonmany epistemic relativists are inclined to equal standing onceMDEP is
granted is that they accept, in addition to MDEP, a further thesis about the possibility
conditions of rational persuasion—epistemic imcommensurability.
Epistemic incommensurability (EI): It is possible for two agents to have
opposing beliefs which are rationally justified to an equal extent where
there is no rational basis by which either agent could properly persuade
the other to revise their view.
Consider that if MDEP were false—that is, if everyone more or less shared the
same epistemic system—then this fact would undercut the putative motivation for
embracing EI, at least, in so far as the kinds of agents we’re interested in are creatures
like us (rather than, say, possible agents very different from us). After all, if everyone
accepted (more or less) the same epistemic system (with only peripheral differences),
then it’s hard to see why rational persuasion wouldn’t at least in principle be possible.
However, the very possibility of rational persuasiondoes indeed lookmuchbleaker
once we grant that epistemic systems can and do radically diverge, a la MDEP. To ap-
preciate why a relativist might be inclined to accept EI, given MDEP, just consider
9(Boghossian 2006, 73).
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Richard Rorty’s (1980) notable diagnosis of the famous 17th century dispute between
Galileo and Cardinal Bellarmine concerning the truth of heliocentrism, where each
reached different and incompatible conclusions. Galileo claimed that heliocentrism
was true, and he appealed to telescopic evidence (and more generally to Western sci-
ence) in support of his claim; Bellarmine denied heliocentrism, embracing instead
geocentrism, on the basis of Scriptural evidence, supplied by the Catechism of the
Catholic Church10. Each verdict came out justified, respectively, with reference to
each’s own accepted epistemic system, but not to the other’s. And further, neither
seemed very well positioned to rationally persuade the other11.
In short,MDEP, taken to its logical conclusion, gives us cases of deep disagreement—
viz., disagreement about some target proposition(s) but also disagreement about what
kinds of evidence are even relevant to adjudicating the target proposition(s)12. The
relativist takes such deep disagreements that are the natural consequence of MDEP as
evidence for EI, a thesis that itself implies the equal standing leg of epistemic plural-
ism. The absolutist by contrasts blocks the move from MDEP to EI to equal standing
by simply denying that MDEP gives rise to EI. There are various ways to do this, both
sceptical and non-sceptical13, though these strategies needn’t concern us here.
What I want to suggest now is that certain substantive commitments in epistemol-
ogy, when paired with MDEP, might arguably at least lead straight to EI (and thus to
equal standing), even for epistemologists who, in embracing these substantive com-
mitments, would prefer to steer clear of relativism.
Enter hereWittgenstenian ‘hinge’ epistemology—an epistemological approach in-
spired by Wittgenstein’s posthumous writings in On Certainty (hereafter, OC), and
which encourages a novel way of thinking about the structure of rational support, one
which has profound implications for the status of our foundational beliefs—viz., be-
liefs of the sort G.E. Moore (1925; cf., 1939) had, erroneously in Wittgenstein’s view,
appealed to in an attempt to prove the existence of the external world. The gist of
Wittgenstien’s positive project can be framed against a background dissatisfaction
with Moore. As Wittgenstein saw it, Moore was in no position to provide evidence
for the claim that he has hands, a claim for which Moore took himself to be absolutely
certain14. Wittgenstein writes:
10For a detailed historical account of this dispute, see Finocchiaro (2009).
11For a detailed discussion of this case, see Carter (2016, Ch. 4). See also Boghossian (2006, Ch.
5–6) and Siegel (2011).
12I am using ‘deep disagreement’ here in a way that is consonant with Hales (2014).
13The most notable sceptical strategy for blocking the move from MDEP to EI is the Pyrrhonian
strategy, which recommends withholding of judgment in the face of disagreement, or equipollence. For
discussion of this strategy, see Carter (2016, Ch. 3).
14For a recent overview of contemporary work on Moore’s proof, see Carter (2012).
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My having two hands is, in normal circumstances, as certain as anything
that I could produce in evidence for it. That is why I am not in a position
to take the sight of my hand as evidence for it. (OC, §250, my italics)
If the structure of rational support relations is such that rational support flows
from only from what is more certain to what is less certain, but not the other way
around, then what is to be said for the epistemic status of those beliefs which are most
certain to one? On Wittgenstein’s view, such certainties—what he calls ‘hinges’—are
themselves arational (not subject to rational support or doubt15) though also entirely
necessary for the practice of rational evaluation. As Wittgenstein puts it:
the questions that we raise and our doubts depend upon the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which
those turn … that is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific inves-
tigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.
But it isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t investigate every-
thing, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption.
If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put. (OC §§341–3)
As Duncan Pritchard (2015, 66) notes, what emerges from Wittgenstein’s think-
ing about hinge propositions and their role within the practice of rational evaluation
is that all rational evaluation is essentially local. Call this the locality of rational eval-
uation thesis, which Pritchard articulates as follows:
Locality of Rational Evaluation Thesis (LRET): ‘[…] all rational eval-
uation is essentially local, in that it takes place relative to fundamental
commitments which are themselves immune to rational evaluation, but
which need to be in place for a rational evaluation to occur’ (2015, 66).
Thedescriptive claimMDEP, against a background commitment to LRET, receives
a more sophisticated gloss. Call the version of MDEP that is available to proponents
of LRET, MDEP+:
MDEP+: There are many fundamentally different, genuinely alternative
sets of hinge propositions, which are themselves immune to rational eval-
uation, and which need to be in place for essentially local (i.e., hinge-
relative) rational evaluation to occur.
15Just as hinge propositions cannot be rationally supported, neither can they be rationally doubted
(e.g. OC §317, §322, §342); to doubt a hinge proposition would be to at the same time call into question
the wider belief system (OC §115, §186). As Wittgenstein notes, ‘If someone doubted whether the earth
had existed a hundred years ago, I should not understand, for this reason: I would not know what such
a person would still allow to be counted as evidence and what not’ (OC §231).
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It looks very much like, even though MDEP itself doesn’t entail EI, MDEP+ does
entail EI. After all, if rational evaluation is essentially local, and if there are funda-
mentally different, genuinely alternative sets of hinge propositions, then—in cases of
deep disagreements (viz., where a dispute concerns both some first order-proposition
as well as what kinds of evidence are even relevant to settling it—it seems as though
there would be no rational basis by which either agent could properly persuade the
other to revise their view. After all, each would be justified relative to her own (local)
set of hinge propositions, which are fundamentally different from one’s interlocutor’s
hinges.
Putting this all together, it looks as though the Wittgenstenian hinge epistemol-
ogist, in virtue of embracing the thesis that all rational evaluation is essentially lo-
cal (LRET), cannot accept moderate descriptive epistemic pluralism—the thesis that
‘there aremany fundamentally different, genuinely alternative epistemic systems’with-
out also going all in for the more controversial ‘equal standing’ leg of epistemic plu-
ralism, viz., the leg that is entailed by the epistemic incommensurability thesis, and
which insists that there are ‘no facts by virtue of which one of these systems is more
correct than any of the others’16.
If the foregoing is right, then a consequence is that ‘hinge’ epistemology is es-
sentially a relativistic epistemology—and indeed, this is the interpretation that many
commentators have preferred17. As Annalisa Coliva (2010, 1) has suggested, ‘Rela-
tivists and anti-relativists alike are nowadays mostly united in considering Wittgen-
stein an epistemic relativist’18.
However, things on this score might not be so straightforward. In recent work,
Duncan Pritchard has defended a creative anti-relativistic manoeuver available to the
Wittgenstenian, one that will require that we examine more carefully the relationship
between MDEP+ and EI.
2. pritchard on descriptive pluralism and radically diver-
gent hinges
MDEP+, to which the Wittgenstenian is committed, insists that there are many ‘fun-
damentally different’, genuinely alternative sets of hinge propositions. In §1, we con-
sidered some examples of epistemic systems that are not merely non-identical (as was
implied by weak descriptive epistemic relativism), but whose differences to each other
16For related discussion on this point, see Coliva (2010a, 188–190) and (2010b, 1–3).
17See, for example, Rorty 1980; Boghossian 2006; Trigg 1973.
18See, however, Williams (e.g., 1996; 2007) for the opposite reading of Wittgenstein’s epistemology,
as a kind of ‘antidote’ to epistemic relativism. Coliva (2010b) and Pritchard (e.g., 2015, passim) also resist
the prevailing relativistic reading of Wittgenstein.
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and our own are striking. It is this fact that seems incontestable. Although it seems
apparent that once MDEP+ is granted, EI looks inevitable, this transition between
MDEP+ and EI might be too quick.
As Duncan Pritchard (2015) puts it:
That all rational evaluation takes place relative to hinge commitments is
entirely compatible with there being a great deal of overlap in subjects’
hinge commitments, even when they are from very different cultures. So
the question we need to ask is whether there can be radical divergence in
one’s hinge commitments19 (2015, 109, my italics).
As Pritchard is using ‘radical’ here and elsewhere (see, e.g., Pritchard 2010, 279–
80), he is taking radical to exclude at least some shared background. MDEP+ is com-
patible with significant divergence between epistemic systems that are not radically
different, in this sense. But given that a shared background could at least potentially
be appealed to in the course of rational persuasion, it will take a slightly stronger ver-
sion of MDEP+ to imply EI (and a fortiori equal standing). Call this stronger version
MDEP++.
MDEP++: There are many radically and fundamentally different, gen-
uinely alternative sets of hinge propositions, which are themselves im-
mune to rational evaluation, and which need to be in place for essentially
local (i.e., hinge-relative) rational evaluation to occur.
But, Pritchard denies MDEP++. This is important because, if it takes MDEP++,
and not merely MDEP+ to commit the hinge epistemologist to EI, then a viable ra-
tionale for rejecting MDEP++ allows the hinge epistemologist, who happily embraces
LRET, to reject the equal standing leg of the epistemic pluralist thesis—viz., the rel-
ativistic leg of the thesis—even while maintaining a plausible version of the descrip-
tive leg of the thesis, MDEP+. Pritchard’s own rationale for rejecting MDEP++ is
grounded in Wittgenstein’s own thinking about the necessity of a shared background
for the possibility of disagreement. For example, Wittgenstein says:
The truth of my statements is the test of my understanding of these state-
ments. That is to say: if I make certain false statements, it becomes un-
certain whether I understand them. (OC, §§80– 81)
In order to make a mistake, a man must already judge in conformity with
mankind. (OC, §156)
19Pritchard is advancing this claim in criticism of Michael Williams’ (1996; 2007) brand of Wittgen-
stenian contextualism, which Pritchard takes to overlook this point.
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In his assessment of these passages, Pritchard remarks:
If this is right, then we can at least count on a dispute between two agents
who are intelligible to one another as involving a shared background of
beliefs, and hence as having shared hinge commitments (2015, 210).
Furthermore, he adds:
The general idea in play here is a familiar one: that wholesale error in an
agent’s beliefs or statements is not even intelligible. As Donald Davidson
(1983: 432) famously put this point, “belief is in its nature veridical.” Such
error would thus be a reason for regarding the agent concerned as not
being a believer or as not being someone who is making statements in
the first place (e.g., it could be a reason to think that the agent is mad). At
the very least, wholesale error of this sort would be a reason for thinking
that the agent in question is not making the statements that she seems
to be making, or doesn’t have the beliefs that were previously credited to
her.
In summary, the picture that Pritchard offers is one that combines two very differ-
ent kinds of descriptive claims, so as to yield a nuanced version of descriptive epistemic
pluralism that—even for the Wittgenstenian who insists that all rational evaluation is
essentially local—arguably does not lead to the epistemic incommensurability the-
sis. The first descriptive claim, which Pritchard (uncontroversially) takes for granted,
is that—for the hinge epistemologist—it must be countenanced that there are fun-
damentally different sets of hinges; this is a concession of epistemic diversity. The
second descriptive claim—one which implies a rejection of MDEP++, is that, at least
some shared background must underlie even disputes framed against very different
sets of hinges, and such a shared background brings with it possibility conditions for
(in principle) rational adjudication of the sort incompatible with EI.
3. shared backgrounds and the über hinge commitment
Pritchard’s position represents an innovative strategy for reconciling, on the one hand,
a concession of epistemic diversity, with, on the other, theWittgenstenian’s contention
that all rational assessment is essentially local, without devolving into EI and thus to
the relatvistic equal standing leg of the epistemic pluralism thesis.
But let’s take a closer look at the claim relied upon to get this result—viz., that
recognising aminimal shared background, even in cases where interlocutors are com-
mitted to very different hinges, blocks the passage from MDEP+ (which the hinge
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epistemologist is committed to) to EI. At core, the claim can be pared down to the
following prima facie plausible idea: that a shared background supplies conditions for
possible rational adjudication. Put another way: for two interlocutors, A and B, and
dispute D, D is not in principle rationally inadjudicable for A and B if there is some
shared background, B, which is a necessary precondition for D.
I think this ismore or less right. However, in recent work, I’ve criticised a version a
special case of this general claim–not by rejecting it outright, but by opting for a mod-
ification of it20. I want to briefly review my proposed modification and then outline
how it influences Pritchard’s strategy. To this end, just imagine a dispute between—
say—a Western scientist, and a member of the Yaohnanen tribe considered in §1 (i.e.,
the tribe that is convinced Prince Phillip is a divine being). Supposewe grant Pritchard
the broadly Davidsonian point that any meaningful disagreement between the scien-
tist and the Yaohnanen requires at least some shared background. Let’s imagine that
the scientist the leader of the Yaohanen (call them Cy and Yao, respectively) attempt
to rationally dispute the claim that Prince Phillip is divine. Cy insists that there is
no scientific evidence that Phillip is divine. Yao appeals to Yaohanen folk legend, ac-
cording to which a ‘pale-skinned’ (Phillip is Caucasian) son of a mountain spirit is
said to have travelled to a faraway land (e.g., England), married a powerful woman (in
this case, Queen Elizabeth) and then returned to them (Phillip visited the island of
Vanatu in 1974). Prince Phillip seemed to the Yaohnanen to fit these criteria to a tee.
Of course, Cy rejects that Yaohanen folk lore is relevant to the truth of the proposition
that Phillip is divine, and the Yaohanen think it clearly is. As things stand, rational
persuasion looks unpromising.
In a case like this one, it’s important to note that merely identifying certain points
of agreement between Cy and Yao needn’t be sufficient for demonstrating the possi-
bility that rational adjudication is possible in light of their respective starting points.
Suppose, in the dialectical situation described, it is pointed out to both parties that
there is some epistemic norm both are happy to accept—viz., a tautological norm that
says Infer A from A. Both Cy and Yao can agree that such a norm is appropriately
neutral between them. However, it’s not yet evident that this fact is significant vis-
à-vis whether the two parties could rationally adjudicate their dispute. The reason
is that such norm, though appropriately neutral, is not appropriately discriminatory
in the sense that such a norm would fail to favour one position over the other; as
such, it would plausibly fail play the kind of role that it would need to in order to
facilitate bringing interlocutors locked in an otherwise irreconcilable position into
a (non-question-begging) resolution. There is another side to this coin: a norm (or
proposition) that that does very well in the ‘discriminatory role’ will plausibly fail to be
20See Carter (2016, Ch. 4).
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appropriately neutral, and thus is not something that can by the lights of both parties
be introduced into a shared background21.
The lesson to be learned is that for two interlocutors, A and B, who antecedently
accept very different hinges, and dispute D, D is possibly rationally inadjudicable for
A and B even if there is some shared background, B, which both A and B are free
to appeal to. Relevant to whether rational adjudication would be possible in such
a circumstance is what, specifically, is shared in the background. It’s not clear that
the kind of shared background that is implied by Pritchard’s Davidsonian line will
be enough to vouchsafe the possibility of rational adjudication in such circumstances;
this is because it’s unclear whether what would be secured in such a backgroundwould
be appropriately discriminatory, in the sense just articulated. And if that’s right, then
it becomes less clear whether MDEP++ can be rejected by the hinge epistemologist
on broadly Davidsonian grounds.
The dialectic at this point can be summarised as: the challenge for theWittgenste-
nian who wants to (i) concede substantial epistemic diversity (of the sort captured by
MDEP+) while embracing LERT (that rational evaluation is essentially local) without
also accepting the epistemic incommensuraility thesis (and a fortiori, equal stand-
ing) that seems to follow from these claims, will be to show how MDEP++ is false.
MDEP++, recall, says that there are many radically and fundamentally different, gen-
uinely alternative sets of hinge propositions, which are themselves immune to rational
evaluation, and which need to be in place for essentially local (i.e., hinge-relative) ra-
tional evaluation to occur. I’ve argued that theDavidsonian line embraced byPritchard,
which involves merely highlighting that some shared background is a necessary pre-
condition for even seemingly deep forms of disagreement, is insufficient for demon-
strating the falsity of MDEP++ because it is in principle compatible with MDEP++.
Interestingly, Pritchard’s recent anti-sceptical work (e.g., 2015, Ch. 4) reveals a
further possible anti-relativistic move that the hinge epistemologist could make at
this juncture, one that appeals to what Pritchard calls an über hinge commitment.
Pritchard’s über hinge strategy might appear promising even if the Davidsonian line
was not for theWittgenstenianwhowishes to reject the EI-entailingMDEP++. Pritchard
articulates the notion of an über hinge (in connection to ordinary hinge commit-
ments) as follows:
[…] closer inspection of this apparently heterogeneous class of hinge
commitments reveals that they all in effect codify, for that particular per-
son, the entirely general hinge commitment that one is not radically and
fundamentally mistaken in one’s beliefs. Call this commitment the über
21See Carter (2016, §4.3) for a more detailed presentation of this point.
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hinge commitment, and call the proposition endorsed by the über hinge
commitment the über hinge proposition.
Perhaps, if as Pritchard elsewhere (e.g., 2015, 206) puts it, ‘A commitment to the
absence of […] systematic deception is […] a plausible manifestation of one’s gen-
eral über hinge commitment’, we could locate a very specific item that will be in any
shared background beyond whatever must be in the shared background between in-
terlocutors simply (a la Davidson) for genuine disagreement to be meaningful. After
all, we can imagine champions of very different epistemic systems failing to radically
diverge (in the sense relevant to MDEP++) simply because their shared commitment
to regarding themselves as not radically deceived might generate for them a stock
of mutually recongnisable propositions, some of which could (perhaps) be not only
appropriately neutral but appropriately discriminatory vis-à-vis their epistemic dis-
agreement.
Or course, one line of criticism to this strategy proceeds as follows: for the über-
hinge strategy to be better-positioned than theDavidsonian strategy for rejectingMEDP++,
further argument is needed for why shared commitment to the über-hinge proposition
(on behalf of both parties representing very different epistemic systems) is such that,
by appealing to it, rational adjudication of the dispute would be possible. Without
additional ‘proof of concept’, the epistemic-incommensurability-entailing MDEP++
seems to remain at least potentially on the table as a plausible commitment of the
hinge epistemologist (given her acceptance of LRET).
There might, however, be a further problem for such a strategy. Here it will
be helpful to consider how a recent worry raised by Crispin Wright’s (2012) to an
anti-sceptical strategy employed by Annalisa Coliva (2012) could potentially be ‘re-
deployed’ as a challenge for advancing the über-hinge strategy as an ‘anti-relativistic’
strategy on behalf of the hinge epistemologist. Here’s Wright (2012):
if it really were constitutive of our conception of rational empirical en-
quiry to assume that there is an externalmaterial world, then there should
be a kind of unintelligibility about a sceptical challenge to the rationality
of this assumption which would be at odds with the sense of paradox cre-
ated by the best sceptical arguments that challenge it. There is, it seems to
me, an implicit tension in the very notion that elements which are con-
stitutive of a concept—which belong primitively to its identity and are
not sustained by other features of it—should be sufficiently opaque to
be controversial and apparently vulnerable to philosophical challenge. If
free action, to take a parallel example, is, conceptually constitutively, sim-
ply action performedwith a sense of freedom, for normal human reasons,
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without external force or duress, why does anyone feel the familiar kind
of challenge posed by determinism as any kind of problem? (2012, 479)
Here, Wright submits as problematic any anti-sceptical strategy that renders un-
intelligible something that appears to be intelligible. In this case, Wright is taking it
that a sceptical challenge to the assumption that there is an external world is at least
intelligible, and it is ceteris paribus problematic if a given anti-sceptical strategy fails
to preserve this. Note that I am here taking no stand as to whether Coliva’s own anti-
sceptical strategy, to which Wright is levelling this critique, actually succumbs to it.
Rather, I want to register the desideratum being highlighted here as a valid one.
I want to now consider that the worry Wright poses to Coliva (framed in terms
of this desideratum) can potentially be recast as a worry for the über hinge strategy,
in so far as it is meant to block the move from descriptive to controversial epistemic
pluralism, via a rejection of MDEP++. To this end, let’s take as a starting point that,
just as the sceptical problem is an intelligible one (one that raises a genuine philo-
sophical tension), so likewise is the problem of epistemic relativism. That is, there
is, as anti-relativist Paul Boghossian (2001) sums it up, ‘[…] a serious difficulty see-
ing how there could be objectively valid reasons for belief, a difficulty that has per-
haps not been adequately faced up to in the analytic tradition’ (2001, 1). But, if it
really were constitutive of the practice of rational assessment (as per the über-hinge
strategy) that certain hinges be in common between even the most radically different
epistemic systems, then there would be a kind of unintelligibility about the relativist’s
challenge, construed as a challenge to vindicate rational assessment as objective (in
a manner incompatible with the ‘equal standing’ leg of epistemic pluralism). To the
extent that this concern is on the right track, an über-hinge styled rationale for reject-
ing MDEP++ will need to be paired with an accompanying story for how the problem
posed by epistemic relativists is as intelligible as it seems.
4. non-relativistic ‘hinge’ epistemology? somefurtherthoughts
Thus far, I have not commented on the vexing question of what is distinctive of a philo-
sophical position rightly called epistemic relativism. Rather, I’ve simply noted that the
more provocative (non-descriptive) leg of the epistemic pluralism thesis (no facts by
virtue of which any epistemic system is more correct than any of the others) is of-
ten taken to be feature of epistemic relativism. Indeed, most self-ascribed epistemic
relativists have embraced this thesis22.
22See, for example, Richard Rorty (1980; 1989), Ian Hacking (1982), Paul Feyerabend (1975) and
Thomas Kuhn (1962) among others.
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However, I want to close by considering how—potentially at least—the hinge epis-
temologist could actually welcome MDEP++, and thus embrace EI along with the
‘equal standing’ leg of the epistemic pluralist thesis, all while maintaining that doing
so is not sufficient for being an epistemic relativism of a genuinely philosophically
interesting sort. This suggestion perhaps sounds bizarre initially, but to appreciate
how it might go, it will require that we look more carefully at Boghossian’s epistemic
pluralist thesis, as it stands embedded (along side an epistemic non-absolutist thesis
and an epistemic relationist thesis) within the wider position Boghossian defines as
epistemic relativism, as follows:
Epistemic Relativism (Boghossian’s Formulation)
A. There are no absolute facts about what belief a particular item of in-
formation justifies. (Epistemic non-absolutism)
B. If a person, S’s, epistemic judgments are to have any prospect of being
true, we must not construe his utterances of the form
“E justifies belief B”
as expressing the claim
E justifies belief B
but rather as expressing the claim:
According to the epistemic systemC, that I, S, accept, information E justifies
belief B. (Epistemic relationism)
C. There are many fundamentally different, genuinely alternative epis-
temic systems, but no facts by virtue of which one of these systems is
more correct than any of the others. (Epistemic pluralism)
The matter of whether this is in fact the right way to characterise the epistemic
relativist’s core insight—as a conjunction of these three claims—has been a matter
of contemporary dispute. In particular, MacFarlane (2014) and Wright (2008) have
called into doubt Boghossian’s inclusion of the epistemic relationist thesis, andwhether
its inclusion can satisfactorialy preserve the difference between relativism proper and
contextualism.
Consider that epistemic contextualists (e.g., DeRose 1992; 2009) insist that the ex-
tension of “knows” or “justified” in attributions of the form “S knows that p” or “S is
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justified in believing P” varies with the context in which these terms are used, and ac-
cordingly sentences that attribute these terms can express different propositions and
have different truth-conditions in different contexts (of use). However, while con-
textualists agree that knowledge/justification ascribing sentences do not get a truth
value, simpliciter, but only relative to a ‘standards parameter’ whose value is supplied
by the context in which they are used, contextualists are happy to agree that justifica-
tion/knowledge ascribing sentences have their truth values absolutely. That is to say,
once the value of the relevant standards parameter is supplied (i.e., in the case of at-
tributor contextualism, the standards operant in the attributor’s context), there is a
once-and-for-all answer to the question of whether a given justification/knowledge
attribution is true.
According to MacFarlane, this is what a proper relativist denies. On MacFarlane’s
brand of epistemic relativism about “knows”, whether a particular use of a knowledge-
ascribing sentence, e.g., “George knows he has a hand” is true depends on the epis-
temic standards at play in the assessor’s context–viz., the context in which the knowl-
edge ascription is being assessed for truth or falsity. But, given that the very same
knowledge ascription can be assessed for truth or falsity from indefinitely many per-
spectives, when I say that George knows he has a hand, what I’ve said does not get a
truth value absolutely, but only relatively23.
Against this background, we can see that—if the hinge epistemologist opts for
MacFarlane’s way of thinking about what makes a philosophical position relativis-
tic in an interesting sense, there is at least some scope for her to embrace both legs
of the epistemic pluralist thesis while at the same time purporting to avoid relativism
(proper) by simply embracing (alongwith epistemic pluralism) the epistemic relation-
ism thesis that MacFarlane takes to disqualify Boghossian’s epistemic relativist from
being a relativist, proper (MacFarlane (2014, 33, fn. 5) reads Boghossian’s relativist
as a contextualist). On the resulting view, the Wittgenstenian can insist that rational
assessment is essentially local in the sense that knowledge/justification attributions do
not get truth values independent of local hinges that supply the relevant standards, but
that once these standards are supplied, knowledge/justification attributions get their
truth-values absolutely.
MacFarlane’s characterisation of relativism in terms of assessment-sensitivity is
controversial, and it’s unclear whether the hinge epistemologist would be satisfied by
this characterisation of the landscape in the first place (or, satisfied enough to advert
to it in justifying how a hinge epistemologist’s commitment to both legs of the epis-
temic pluralist thesis might be taxonomised as contextualism rather than relativism).
I simply register this point as ameans of showing the full scope of the hinge epistemol-
ogist’s options in the face of the original dilemma. The original dilemma for the hinge
23See Carter (2016, Ch. 7; 2017) for further discussion of these differences.
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epistemologist—viz., either reject (as Pritchard has) some version of descriptive epis-
temic pluralism or embrace the most provocative leg of the pluralist thesis—remains
I think one of the most vexing issues facing hinge epistemologists who are convinced
that rational assessment is a local affair while at the same time put off by the prospect
of full-blown relativism.
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